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ABSTRACT--What infants appear to know depends heavily on how they are tested. For
example, infants seem to understand object permanence (that objects continue to exist when no
longer perceptible) within the first few months of life when this understanding is assessed
through looking measures, but not until several months later when it is assessed through search
measures. One explanation of such results is that infants gradually develop stronger
representations of objects through experience, and that stronger representations are required for
some tasks than for others. The current study confirms one prediction from this account:
Stronger representations of familiar objects (relative to novel objects) should support greater
sensitivity to their continued existence. After seeing objects hidden, infants reached more for
familiar than novel objects, in striking contrast to their robust novelty preferences with visible
objects. Theoretical implications concerning the origins of knowledge are discussed.
2Fundamental debates in the study of cognitive development concern the origins of
knowledge. Scientists continue to grapple with even basic questions in this domain, because
different lines of evidence support divergent interpretations. One example concerns the origins of
knowledge about object permanence, or the understanding that objects continue to exist when no
longer perceptible. Infants demonstrate sensitivity to object permanence at quite different ages
depending on how the concept is measured. Infants as young as 2.5 months look longer at
impossible events with hidden objects (e.g., one object seems to pass through the space occupied
by a second, hidden object) than at possible events (Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson,
1992). Yet infants fail to search for objects hidden in the dark until they are several months older
(Goubet & Clifton, 1998; Hood & Willatts, 1986) and search for objects hidden by covers later
still (Piaget, 1954; Shinskey & Munakata, 2003). Explaining why infants exhibit such behavioral
dissociations in different tasks ostensibly measuring the same concept may critically inform
debates surrounding the origins of knowledge.
One explanation for such dissociations suggests that infants gradually develop stronger
mental representations of objects through experience, with stronger representations required for
some tasks than for others (Munakata, McClelland, Johnson, & Siegler, 1997). Weak
representations of a hidden object may support 2.5-month-olds' sensitivity to violations of its
permanence, but stronger representations may be necessary to drive 5- to 7-month-olds' manual
search in the dark, and even more robust representations to drive 8- to 10-month-olds' search
when confronting a visible barrier. According to this graded-representations account and related
perspectives, representations of hidden objects may strengthen gradually with experience
perceiving and interacting with objects (Fischer & Bidell, 1991; Haith & Benson, 1997; Piaget,
1954). Repeated exposures to a stimulus can produce changes in the patterns of neural activity
representing that stimulus, as demonstrated in single-cell recording studies with nonhuman
primates (Miller & Desimone, 1994), electrophysiological studies with humans (Curran, 2000),
and artificial neural network models (Munakata et al., 1997). Such changes from repeated
exposures could strengthen representations of familiar objects, so that these representations can
be maintained when the objects are hidden, supporting a developing sensitivity to the continued
existence of hidden objects (Munakata et al., 1997). One prediction from this perspective is that
infants’ sensitivity to object permanence may be greater with familiar objects than with novel
objects.
 The current study tested this prediction: If infants have stronger representations for
familiar than for novel objects, and if these stronger representations support greater sensitivity to
the continued existence of the objects when hidden, infants should search more for familiar
hidden objects than for novel hidden objects.1 This prediction may be counterintuitive, because
infants typically display robust preferences for novelty over familiarity when stimuli are
perceptible, as demonstrated across countless experiments on perception (Fantz, 1964), memory
(Diamond, 1995), language (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996), categorization (Quinn & Eimas,
1996), and number (Lipton & Spelke, 2003). Novelty preferences reflect the efficiency of
immature organisms’ information processing: Once infants have mastered all the information
one stimulus offers, attending to a new stimulus is an adaptive strategy for acquiring large
amounts of information in a short time. Indeed, lack of novelty preference in infancy predicts
cognitive delays in childhood (Rose & Feldman, 1995). Thus, the natural prediction is that
infants should show novelty preferences with both visible and hidden objects. (Infants sometimes
show familiarity preferences under limited circumstances not relevant to the present study, a
point we return to in the Discussion.) In contrast, we predicted that robust novelty preferences
with visible objects would reverse to familiarity preferences with hidden objects. Stronger
representations of familiar objects should lead to less interest in them when visible (and more
3exploration of novel objects), but greater sensitivity to their continued existence when they are
hidden (and less exploration of novel objects).
METHOD
Twenty-four full-term 7-month-olds participated (range: 7 months 1 day-7 months 21
days; M = 7 months 10 days; 12 girls). Fifteen additional infants participated but were excluded
because of fussiness (9), experimenter error (3), equipment failure (1), parental interference (1),
and difficulty reaching for visible objects (1).
Infants were presented with one object at a time, familiar or novel, under visible or
hidden conditions. Stimuli consisted of clay objects differing in shape and color and were
designed to reduce the risk that infants would have inherent preferences among them. To equate
for attractiveness, we counterbalanced the object designated familiar across infants.
We hid objects using darkness, as in previous studies (Goubet & Clifton, 1998; Hood &
Willatts, 1986), to minimize motor and problem-solving demands and to equate reaching
demands for visible and hidden objects. A video camera equipped with infrared light for taping
in the dark recorded infants from above. Strips of glow-in-the-dark tape flanked the search space
to orient infants in the dark without revealing the object.
The procedure began with six 7-s trials of familiarization with the dark, followed by a
familiarization phase in which we presented infants with the same object on repeated trials
during which they were allowed 7 s to reach. Familiarization ended when the infant stopped
reaching for the object on 2 consecutive trials or reached for a maximum 24 trials (M = 14, SE =
1.44). Each infant then received 16 test trials, 4 trials each of four events: familiar-visible, novel-
visible, familiar-hidden, and novel-hidden (see Fig. 1). The familiar-visible event was identical to
familiarization trials: We presented the familiar object on each trial and allowed the infant 7s to
reach. The novel-visible event was identical to the familiar-visible event except that a different
novel object was presented on each trial. Familiar-hidden and novel-hidden events were identical
to familiar-visible and novel-visible events, respectively, except that after infants fixated the
object, we hid the object in the dark by turning off the light, and a different set of novel objects
was used for the novel-hidden events. The four trials for each event were blocked together, with
blocks presented in one of eight counterbalanced orders.
On familiarization and test trials, a reach was scored if the infant’s hand crossed into the
half-circle (10-cm diameter) surrounding the object and was less than 9 cm above the table.
These criteria helped equate the reaching demands for visible and hidden objects, and allowed
infants to reach without a precise object grasp. Because the experimenter could not see the
infant’s behavior in the dark, an observer watched the session on a monitor from a lightproof
booth in the room, signaling the experimenter with a beeping sound over an earphone when the
infant reached. To prevent the infant from executing a reach in the dark that he or she had
planned in the light, the experimenter instructed the parent to restrain the infant’s hands, ensured
that the infant fixated the object, turned the light off, waited 1 s, and then tapped the parent’s foot
as the signal to release the infant’s hands. To equate hidden and visible trials, the experimenter
signaled the parent 1 s after ensuring the infant fixated the object on the visible trials.
In addition to the primary coder, two secondary coders who were blind to the study
hypotheses scored nonoverlapping halves of the data. Reliability between the primary coder and
the blind coders was 98.44% (agreement on 378 out of 384 trials).
RESULTS
As predicted, when objects were visible, infants reached more for novel objects than for
the familiar object, but when objects were hidden, they reversed this strong novelty preference
4by reaching more for the familiar object than for novel objects. Analysis of variance yielded a
significant interaction of visibility with familiarity, F(1, 23) = 51.33, p < .001, ηp
2 = .69.2 When
objects were visible, infants reached for a novel object on 88% (SE = 5%) of trials and for the
familiar object on 39% (SE = 6%) of trials, t(23) = 7.83, p < .001, d = 1.88. In contrast, when
objects were hidden, infants reached for a novel object on only 20% (SE = 5%) of trials and for
the familiar object on 32% (SE = 7%) of trials, t(23) = -2.97, p < .01, d = 0.48. Nonparametric
analyses revealed a similar pattern (see Fig. 2a for the numbers of infants showing a novelty
preference vs. a familiarity preference). On visible trials, 20 infants reached more for novel
objects than for the familiar object, whereas none reached more for the familiar object, and 4
reached equally for the two kinds of objects, Wilcoxon Z = -3.98, p < .001. In contrast, on
hidden trials, only 3 infants reached more for novel objects than for the familiar object, whereas
13 reached more for the familiar object, and 8 reached equally for the two kinds of objects,
Wilcoxon Z = -2.56, p < .05. Of these latter 8 infants, 7 failed to reach at all, rather than reaching
indiscriminately.
Results were also consistent with object representations strengthening with experience in
that the effect increased over trials, as indicated by a three-way interaction of visibility,
familiarity, and trial (1 vs. 4), _2(1, N = 24) = 17.04, p < .0001. This effect was driven by
changes across trials with the familiar object only (Fig. 2b). Reaching for the familiar object
increased across trials when it was hidden, _2(1, N = 24) = 5.54, p < .05, but showed a trend to
decrease across trials when it was visible, _2(1, N = 24) = 3.14, p = .076. In contrast, reaching for
novel objects did not change.
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Fig. 1. Examples of the four test events. Hidden events are illustrated using infrared photography
but were completely dark from the infant's perspective, except for the glow-in-the-dark strips on
the sides. The black half-circle on the table was used by coders to score reaches.
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Fig. 2. Infants' reaching for novel and familiar objects, when visible and hidden. The graphs
show the percentage of infants exhibiting novelty and familiarity preferences (a) and the
percentage of infants reaching for the object as a function of trial number (b).
7DISCUSSION
As predicted, when objects were hidden, infants reached more for a familiar object than
for novel objects, in direct contrast to their novelty preference with visible objects. This is the
first demonstration of its kind. Although infants in other studies have displayed familiarity
preferences with visible stimuli under certain circumstances, these results reflect insufficient
processing of the familiar stimulus because of infants' age, stimulus complexity, or limited
familiarization time (Hunter & Ames, 1988; Meltzoff & Borton, 1979). In contrast, in the current
study, infants' strong novelty preference with visible objects demonstrated that the infants
processed the familiar object sufficiently. Yet they still reached more for the familiar object than
for novel objects when objects were hidden. Stronger representations of familiar objects (relative
to novel objects) can thus lead to reduced exploration when they are visible, but greater
exploration when they are hidden.
Changes in representations can occur with even relatively brief experiences. In the
present experiment, reaching for the familiar object more than doubled across trials when it was
hidden, but tended to decrease across trials when it was visible (whereas reaching for novel
objects did not change). This pattern suggests that the representation of the familiar object
strengthened over only four trials in one experimental session. Likewise, in previous research,
merely 2 min of experience tracking a visible moving object enhanced 4-month-olds'
anticipations of the object's reappearance when its trajectory was briefly occluded (Johnson,
Amso, & Slemmer, 2003).
These results inform several perspectives on the origins of physical knowledge.
According to the graded-representations account motivating this study, learning from repeated
exposures to stimuli may strengthen the ability to represent hidden objects’ continued existence.
Weak representations of hidden objects may suffice for some tasks but not others, leading to the
behavioral dissociations observed across development. From this perspective, understanding of
concepts such as object permanence may originate in learning from specific experiences. Such
learning may begin with familiar objects, only later generalizing to all objects. Neural network
models have demonstrated how such generalization processes may rely on neural regions (e.g.,
prefrontal cortex) with computational processes distinct from those of other regions for
processing specific objects (Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen, & O'Reilly, 2005). This graded-
representations perspective complements a shift in the study of some areas of cognitive
development toward a focus on the remarkable specificity of infants' knowledge (e.g.,
Baillargeon, 2004) and the effects of specific experiences on learning (e.g., Thelen & Smith,
1994).
In contrast, some researchers posit that initial knowledge takes the form of abstract
principles that may be innate (e.g., Marcus, 1998; Spelke et al., 1992). From this perspective,
behaviors inconsistent with abstract principles (e.g., looking-reaching dissociations) reflect
performance factors rather than competence. For example, infants might have a concept of object
permanence but fail to reach for hidden objects because of deficits in problem-solving skills
(e.g., removing a barrier to obtain an object; Diamond, 1991). Or infants might have a concept of
object permanence but not remember novel objects as well as familiar objects. Studies show that
some potential performance factors do not fully explain infants' behavior (e.g., Shinskey &
Munakata, 2001), but additional performance factors could be posited to explain behaviors
appearing inconsistent with abstract principles. However, the growing number of performance
factors reduces the explanatory power of abstract-principles accounts. In addition, apparent
changes in performance factors can actually emerge from changes in knowledge representations
(MacDonald & Christiansen, 2002; Munakata et al., 1997).
8A more recent treatment of cognitive development focuses on cognitive load; infants'
failures on various tasks may reflect their limited resources being overloaded by processing
demands, from actions and physical reasoning (Boudreau & Bushnell, 2000; Keen, Carrico,
Sylvia, & Berthier, 2003). Infants may succeed in looking tasks earlier than reaching tasks
because of differences in action complexity. Or, when objects are hidden, infants may reach
more for familiar than novel objects because representing novel objects requires more cognitive
effort. From this perspective, infants fail not because they lack problem-solving skills or
understanding of object permanence, but because when either problem solving or object
representation becomes difficult, the other suffers. Some forms of the cognitive-load account
may be compatible with abstract-principles approaches, for example, if cognitive load is viewed
as a performance factor preventing infants from revealing underlying competence. Other forms
of the cognitive-load account may be compatible with the graded-representations account, for
example, if remembering novel objects is more effortful than remembering familiar objects
because of the nature of the representations of those objects.
Further specifying and differentiating such possibilities will be an important step in
understanding why infants' apparent knowledge varies so greatly depending on the testing
method. The current findings provide an important constraint in this process: As infants begin
searching when objects are hidden, they demonstrate greater sensitivity to the continued
existence of familiar objects than novel objects, despite robust novelty preferences when objects
are visible. Reconciling such variations in infant sensitivity should ultimately inform
fundamental questions concerning the origins of knowledge.
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1Previous studies manipulated object familiarity in search tasks (e.g., Jackson, Campos, &
Fischer, 1978; Legerstee, 1994), but the results are difficult to interpret. First, stimuli were not
equated for factors such as attractiveness and emotional significance (e.g., familiar stimuli were
objects or people from home, whereas novel stimuli were objects or people from the lab).
Second, results were collapsed across different events, with objects that were fully hidden, partly
visible, or fully visible, and with silent and sounding objects. Thus, these studies do not address
whether novelty and familiarity preferences differ depending on object visibility.
2These proportional data were corrected with arcsine transformation to satisfy the assumption of
homogeneity. Analysis of variance also yielded main effects revealing that infants reached more
for visible (M = 87%, SE = 7%) than hidden (M = 31%, SE = 8%) objects, F(1, 23) = 22.00, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .49, and more for novel (M = 74%, SE = 5%) than familiar (M = 43%, SE = 5%)
objects, F(1, 23) = 37.46, p < .001, ηp
2 = .62.
